

VZCZCXYZ0016
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHKT #0047/01 0050844
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 050844Z JAN 06
FM AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9774
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 3801
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 3475
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 8994
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L KATHMANDU 000047

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR SA/INS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/05/2016
TAGS: [PTER](#) [PGOV](#) [PREL](#) [NP](#)
SUBJECT: UML WORRIED ABOUT KING MORE THAN MAOISTS

REF: A. 05 KATHMANDU 2956

[1](#)B. 05 KATHMANDU 2969

Classified By: Ambassador James F. Moriarty. Reasons 1.4 (b/d).

Summary

[1](#)1. (C) Arguing that the King forced the Maoists to end their cease-fire, UML leader MK Nepal suggested to the Ambassador on January 4 three scenarios in which the Parties would chastise the Maoists for violence. The Ambassador countered that there was no excuse for the resumption of violence. MK Nepal agreed, and noted that the Parties "could not support the path of violence." He argued, however, that the Maoists would lose all support if they had no weapons, and therefore concluded that the autocratic monarchy was a greater threat than the Maoists. The Ambassador cautioned it was short-sighted to say it was impossible for the Maoists to take over. Saying it would be "suicidal" for Maoists to attack American interests, MK Nepal dismissed any fear that the Maoists had changed their policy of not targeting Americans. End Summary.

Maoist Tripwires

[1](#)2. (C) MK Nepal, UML leader, told the Ambassador on January 4 that the Parties still supported the 12-point understanding despite the end of the cease-fire, but were concerned about the Maoist's return to violence. In response to the Ambassador's question, he outlined three cases in which the Parties would chastise the Maoists for violence: 1) if the Maoists disrupted the political parties and restricted their activities in the countryside; 2) if the Maoists "went mad" and killed indiscriminately; and 3) if the Maoists targeted for assassination non-combatant civilians, including government officials. The Ambassador said he hoped to see a clear statement from the Parties if the Maoists violated these principles.

There Can Be No Excuse for Violence

[1](#)3. (C) MK Nepal said the Parties had encouraged the Maoists to extend the cease-fire, but the government was attacking the Maoist cadre and the Parties could not protect them. Thus the King's lack of reciprocation had forced the Maoists

to act. The Ambassador countered by quoting the USG January 3 statement, saying "there can be no excuse for the resumption of violence." MK Nepal agreed, saying the Parties "could not support the path of violence." He noted that the Parties had "tried our best to solve the problem through a political solution."

UML Worried about King More Than Maoists

¶4. (C) MK Nepal admitted that the Maoists "might betray" the Parties. But, he said that the Maoists could not capture Kathmandu to establish a regime, as neither the international community (India, China, EU and US) nor the people in Nepal would accept a Maoist government. He added that even if Maoists captured the capital, "they certainly could not keep it." He said that the Parties did not fear Maoist ideology but they feared the autocratic rule of the King. He said people were no longer wondering when the King would reach out to the Parties, and instead doubted he would do so at all. According to MK Nepal, the King was on his own path. In contrast, he said that without modern weapons the Maoists would lose all support. Arguing that "the enemy of my enemy is my friend," he noted that the Maoists also wanted an end to the autocratic monarchy. In response, the Ambassador cautioned that it was short-sighted to say there was no way for the Maoists to take over. He noted that the Maoists seemed to care little about the international community and he reminded MK Nepal that Maoists had taken up arms in 1996 against a ruling multi-party Parliamentary democracy, not against a royal autocracy. He suggested it was unlikely the Maoists would surrender their guns voluntarily. MK Nepal countered that the Maoists were "gradually changing their thinking" and now the Parties were watching to see a "change in behavior." The Ambassador cautioned that Maoist rhetoric of change might only be tactical.

Maoists Won't Target Americans

¶5. (C) Referring to the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights' (OHCHR) December 28 statement that the Maoist leadership had given assurances that they had not instructed cadre to abduct or kill as part of their anti-election plan (ref A), MK Nepal said that the Maoists "lied to the UN." He also worried that the Maoist leadership could not control "irresponsible behavior at the grassroots level." However, taking up a point raised by the CDA on December 30 (ref B), MK Nepal dismissed the notion that the Maoists might target Americans. He said he had repeatedly warned the Maoists "not to make too many enemies" and that it would be "suicidal" for Maoists to attack American interests.

Referring to the September 2004 bombing of the American Center, MK Nepal said "the Maoists learned what not to do from past mistakes." He said the Maoists had assured him that attacking Americans was not their policy then or now.

Comment

¶6. (C) Because he wants to believe, MK Nepal sees a change in Maoist thinking and action. However, Post finds little evidence to support this. Post is not sure whether he made up on the spot the three scenarios under which he would criticize the Maoists, but we are glad to see that he acknowledges that there must be some limit to Maoist violence and that he understands that the international community cannot tolerate Maoist atrocities.

MORIARTY